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RICO'S NEW COMMUNITY OF RACKETEERS: THE
NEED FOR A PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION
REQUIREMENT
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) in 19701 to curb the infiltration of legitimate businesses by
organized crime.2 Congress armed RICO with harsh criminal3 and civil'
penalties. Congress also included strict criminal forfeiture provisions to
divest organized crime of the "fruits of its ill-gotten gains."5 In short,
1. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
2. Congress enacted RICO as title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA),
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970). OCCA derived predominantly from S. 30, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess., 115 CONG. Rmc. 769 (1969). See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1969). Con-
gress was particularly concerned with the defects in the evidence-gathering process that allowed
known organized crime figures to elude punishment. The first seven titles of OCCA strengthen the
government's ability to gather evidence against members of organized crime. See 116 CONG. REC.
584-85 (1970) (S. 30 "is designed to strengthen and improve the evidence-gathering process in the
field of organized crime").
A 1968 House Committee Report on organized crime identified four principal methods by which
organized crime infiltrates legitimate businesses: (1) investing concealed profits acquired from gam-
bling and other illegal activities, (2) accepting business interests in payment of the owner's gambling
debts, (3) foreclosing on usurious loans, and (4) using various forms of extortion and unfair business
practices. House Comm. on Government Operations, FEDERAL EFFORT AGAINST ORGANIZED
CRIME, H.R. REP. No. 1574, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968). The Committee noted the reasons why
organized crime infiltrates legitimate businesses: to increase profits, often through ruthless elimina-
tion of competitors; to shield illegal activities; to obtain marketing agencies for illegal or counterfeit
products; and to gain social respectability. Id.
3. The criminal sanctions for a violation of RICO are imprisonment for up to twenty years
and/or a fine of S25,000, and forfeiture of any interest in an unlawful enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(Supp. 1985). For a discussion of these criminal sanctions, see Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L.
REV. 291, 305-08 (1983); Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C § 1963-RICO's Most Powerful
Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 391-92 (1980).
4. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (1984) provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
In addition, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a) (1984) grants the district courts "jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962" and lists examples of equitable relief that courts may grant the
government. Section 1964(b) authorizes the Attorney General to pursue civil remedies and
§ 1964(d) estops the defendant, once convicted under criminal RICO, from denying the essential
allegations of a RICO violation in a subsequent civil proceeding brought by the government. For an
early discussion of these government civil remedies, see Note, Equitable Law Enforcement and the
Organized Crime ControlAct of 1970 - United States v. Cappetto, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 508 (1976);
Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal
Activity", 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192 (1975).
5. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981); see also 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970)
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Congress enacted RICO to undermine the financial foundations of organ-
ized crime.'
A person is subject to RICO's criminal and civil penalties if he violates
a substantive provision of section 1962.' Section 1962 provides that an
individual may not invest in, control, or participate in the conduct of the
affairs of an "enterprise"8 through a "pattern of racketeering activity." 9
Section 1961(5) provides that "a pattern of racketeering activity requires
at least two acts of racketeering activity."' Finally, section 1961(1) enu-
merates the state and federal crimes that constitute "racketeering
activity.""1
A plaintiff in a civil RICO action must prove each element of the two
underlying predicate acts12 by a preponderance of the evidence.t" If the
(statement of Senator Hruska) (RICO is broadly aimed at "striking a mortal blow against the prop-
erty interests of organized crime").
6. RICO is not a regulatory statute. It does not simply govern the manner in which organized
crime carries out its activities. Rather, RICO seeks to uproot the financial foundations of organized
crime. See Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983):
The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition in the marketplace.
RICO has the opposite purpose. It is precisely designed to ruin those individuals and
enterprises it is aimed at. It is not designed to increase their efficiency or protect them
from insolvency.
7. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (1984).
8. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (1984) defines "enterprise" to include "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981), the
Supreme Court held that the term "enterprise" encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enter-
prises. Recently, in Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third
Circuit held that the defendant must be separate from the alleged enterprise. But see United States v.
Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (1lth Cir. 1982) (defendant and enterprise may be the same), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) provides: " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [Oct. 15,
1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
10. Id.
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent part:
"racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gam-
bling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, . . . or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year; (B) any act which is indictable under ... [various] provisions of title 18, United
States Code... ; (D) any offense involving [bankruptcy] fraud . . ., fraud in the sale of
securities.., punishable under any law of the United States....
Id. (emphasis added). The acts of racketeering activity are commonly referred to as the "predicate
acts."
12. Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 581 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
13. For a discussion of the appropriate burden of proof in civil RICO actions, see Matz, Deter-
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plaintiff is successful, the defendant is subject to treble damage liability
under section 1964(c)."4
Although prosecutors have invoked criminal RICO regularly since
1975, private civil RICO 5 has developed into a significant source of
commercial litigation only within the last three years.16 Private civil
RICO, however, has failed to address the criminal element that threatens
to undermine the nation's economy.17 Rather, civil RICO has created a
new community of racketeers. The Supreme Court recently recognized
that RICO has been applied against "respected businesses.., rather than
against the archetypal, intimidating mobster."1" In addition, private civil
RICO has interfered with the objectives of other federal statutes.19 As a
result, Congress should reevaluate the role of private citizens in the en-
forcement of RICO against organized crime and should amend RICO
accordingly.
Part I of this Note discusses the misuse of RICO by civil litigants,
particularly in securities litigation. Part II examines judicially imposed
limitations on RICO's broad scope. In part III, this Note suggests
mining the Standard of Proof in Lawsuits Brought Under RICO, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 21, col.
I.
14. See supra note 4.
15. One commentator notes that "RICO did not gain popularity among prosecutors until after
a Justice Department strike force toured the country in 1975 educating them and FBI agents on the
law's benefits." Tybor, Racketeering Law Facing Key Test, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 29, 1980, at 18, col. 1.
16. By 1982 courts had published about fifteen decisions on § 1964(c). Today, there are well
over two hundred reported decisions. One commentator attributes the dearth of civil RICO cases
prior to 1982 to early judicial attempts to restrict the scope of RICO. Long, Treble Damages for
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil
Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201, 209-10 (1981). A more plausable explanation of civil
RICO's slow start is that even the most imaginative commercial lawyers believed that RICO was
aimed only at organized crime. Moreover, prior to 1980, no pressing need existed for securities
lawyers to find alternative remedies to the federal securities laws. See infra notes 23-47 and accom-
panying text.
Several factors fueled the recent explosion of private RICO actions. First, judicial trends restrict-
ing the availability of private remedies for federal securities laws violations spurred the search for
new methods to recover damages for securities fraud. See infra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
Second, Congress commanded that RICO be liberally construed. See OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970) ("The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes."). Third, the criminal nature, mob-influenced connotations, and broad
discovery provisions of RICO made it a useful tactical weapon for harassment or other improper
purposes. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. Finally, RICO offered plaintiffs the pros-
pect of treble damages and attorney's fees. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. See, eg., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985).
18. Id. at 3287.
19. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
232 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
amending RICO to create a private cause of action only after the govern-
ment has obtained a criminal RICO conviction of the defendant. Fi-
nally, part IV of this Note evaluates the operation of the proposed
amendment.
I. THE MISUSE OF RICO IN SECURITIES LITIGATION
The use of private civil RICO in securities litigation provides a useful
paradigm of RICO's abuse. First, private litigants employ RICO to ac-
complish goals wholly unrelated to the purpose of the statute. Second,
private litigants employ RICO in a manner that undermines the struc-
ture of express and implied remedies under the federal securities laws.
Congress intended RICO to combat the ability of organized crime to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate businesses.20 Congress did not intend
RICO to serve as a regulatory alternative to the federal securities laws.2
Although RICO may apply to securities litigation because securities
fraud is a section 1961 predicate act, Congress intended RICO to remedy
the theft and fraudulent resale of securities, rather than nondisclosure
violations.22 Therefore, the use of private civil RICO in securities litiga-
tion accomplishes goals wholly unrelated to the purpose of the statute.
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed the fed-
eral securities laws,23 allowing only limited private securities fraud reme-
dies.24 For example, by refusing to imply a private cause of action under
20. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
21. The federal securities laws were not intended "to provide a comprehensive remedy for all
fraud." Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S.Ct. 2297, 2303 (1985) (rejecting the sale of business
doctrine). Thus, the use of RICO would frustrate the broad but carefully defined scope of the federal
securities laws.
22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(l)(D) (Supp. 1985). In addition to relying on securities fraud, a RICO
plaintiff may rely on mail and wire fraud as predicate acts to establish a RICO violation.
23. See, eg., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 736 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Refusing to imply a private cause of action under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
Justice Powell criticized the implication of private remedies under the federal securities laws:
A break in this pattern occurred in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak. There the Court held that a
private party could maintain a cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, in spite of Congress' express creation of an administrative mechanism for enforc-
ing that statute. I find this decision both unprecedented and incomprehensible as a matter
of public policy. The decision's rationale, which lies ultimately in the judgment that
'[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission
action', ignores the fact that Congress, in determining the degree of regulation to be im-
posed on companies covered by the Securities Exchange Act, already decided that private
enforcement was unnecessary.
Id at 735-36 (citations omitted).
24. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Burger Court limited
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section 14(e) of the Williams Act for takeover bidders,25 the Court at-
tempted to assure "neutrality" in contests for corporate control and
thereby to further shareholder protection.26 The Court's reluctance to
imply private causes of action has forced lawyers to search for alternative
avenues of relief. As a result, many lawyers have turned to RICO.27
The general application of RICO to securities fraud, however, conflicts
with the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the federal securities
laws.28 For example, the use of RICO in struggles for corporate control
undermines the delicate balance of power between management, share-
holders, and bidders established by the Williams Act and reaffirmed by
the Court in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.29 RICO is especially
useful as a weapon against takeover bids because a target corporation can
the availability of a private remedy under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and
rule lOb-5 to purchasers and sellers of securities. Since J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964),
the Supreme Court has consistently declined to create new private remedies or expand existing pri-
vate remedies under the securities laws. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977)
(private cause of action should not be implied when it is "unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of
Congress' purposes" in adopting the Act).
The Court in Blue Chip Stamps pointed to the abuse of the implied private remedy under rule lOb-
5 as a means: (1) to obtain increased settlement pressure, (2) to obtain liberal discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) to frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendants,
and (4) to survive summary judgment and prolong litigation with a concommitant increase in settle-
ment value. 421 U.S. at 740-41. With respect to litigants whose legitimate claims might be barred
by a court's restrictive approach, the Court noted that "this disadvantage is attenuated to the extent
that remedies are available ... under state law." Id. at 721 n.9.
Additionally, in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977), Justice White argued
that unchecked private use of the federal securities laws would improperly intrude on state law. In
particular, the Court noted that some states have supplied minority shareholders with carefully
structured remedies to recover the fair value of shares allegedly undervalued in a short-form merger.
The Court feared that minority shareholders might undermine these remedies by invoking rule lOb-
5. Id.
25. The Williams Act regulates stock acquisitions and tender offers. The Williams Act added
§§ 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), and 14(t) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
26. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977). The Supreme Court recog-
nized that Congress adopted a policy of "neutrality" in contests for corporate control and refused to
imply a private cause of action under § 14(e) of the Williams Act. The Court added that this "ex-
press policy of neutrality scarcely suggests an intent to confer highly important, new rights upon the
class of participants whose activities prompted the legislation in the first instance." Id.
27. See supra note 16.
28. RICO is an attractive alternative remedy for securities fraud because, unlike any of the
federal securities laws, RICO contains an express private treble damage remedy. See supra note 4.
29. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1981), the Supreme Court
struck down the Illinois Business Takeover Act as violative of the commerce clause. The Court
stated that the Illinois Act frustrated the congressional purpose of the Williams Act by introducing
extended delay into the tender offer process. Id. at 637. The use of RICO as a defense against
unfriendly tender offers results in exactly the same kind of delay.
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employ it defensively as a means of harassment and delay."
Plaintiffs have also used civil RICO in a number of other securities
contexts to avoid narrow federal and state securities laws. Management
and shareholders have employed RICO as a defensive tactic in takeover
battles,31 proxy contests, 32 contested mergers, 33 and minority squeeze-
outs. 34 Plaintiffs have also used RICO to allege violations regarding in-
sider trading, 35 self-dealing,36 "churning, ' 37 market manipulation, 38 and
nondisclosure.39
The use of RICO in this manner could stigmatize an otherwise law-
abiding corporate officer or director." Although individuals familiar
30. One commentator accurately predicted the prolific application of RICO to securities litiga-
tion, noting that "RICO may well prove to be to the 1980's what Rule lOb-5 was in its day." Morri-
son, Old Bottle - Not So New Wine: Treble Damages in Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 10
SEc. REG. L.J. 67, 83 (1982). Another commentator has strongly urged the securities bar to use
RICO as an alternative remedy to the federal securities laws. See Long, Treble Damages for Viola-
tions of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of
Action, 85 DiCK. L. R. 201, 205 (1981).
31. See, eg., Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources, Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 98,742 (N.D. OHIo 1983) (RICO claim based on allegations that offeror
filed false and misleading schedules in connection with purchase of Hanna stock).
32. See, eg., Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
98,834 (D.D.C. 1982).
33. See eg., Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500 (D.D.C. 1984) (minority
shareholders sue to recover fair value of stock).
34. See, eg., Friedlander v. Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (conspiracy to
freeze out minority shareholders by means of misleading written and oral communications).
35. See, eg., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1358 (S.D.N.Y.) (plaintiffs sold
their stock below subsequently announced tender offer price), rev'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (plaintiffs bought interests in oil and gas leases based on material misrepresentation of value).
See also Wang, Recent Developments in the Federal Law Regulating Stock Market Insider Trading, 6
CORP. L. Rav. 291, 315 (1983) (formulating theories of liability under RICO for insider trading
violations).
36. See, eg., Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (plaintiffs
based RICO claim on fraud and self-dealing in connection with a tender offer).
37. See, eg., Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 581, 583 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(plaintiffs based RICO claim on excessive trading of commodities futures trading); Mauriber v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
38. See, eg., Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp. 1061, 1063 (N.D. I11.
1981) (plaintiffs alleged that broker manipulated the market to artificially depress the price of certain
securities).
39. See Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities'" 18 GA.
L. REV. 43, 54-55 (1983).
40. Corporate executives often express shock and disbelief when sued under RICO. See Mar-
kus, Racketeering Law Increasingly Invoked to Thwart Takeovers, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1983, at 1,
col. 4 (one renowned takeover specialist proclaimed: "I consider it an abomination that a company's
management should resort to these gutter and smear tactics.").
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with the use of RICO in securities litigation would understand the lim-
ited import of the allegation,41 uninformed third parties, including share-
holders, may be alarmed.42 Publicity of a racketeering charge against a
tender offeror, for example, may prejudice the target company's share-
holders against the offeror.
4 3
Finally, litigants employ civil RICO as a tool for harassing the oppos-
ing side through unwarranted discovery.' The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow discovery of matters relevant to the subject matter of
the litigation.45 Because the subject matter of a securities-RICO action is
broader than that of a securities action alone, the Federal Rules author-
ize inquiry into matters beyond the scope of an inquiry brought under
the securities laws.46 This authorization of broad discovery poses poten-
tial for serious abuse.47
41. Because of RICO's blatant abuse, few securities lawyers associate RICO with organized
crime. In fact, one securities practitioner suggested that failure to bring a RICO action in a securi-
ties case might constitute malpractice. 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 15, 754 (Apr. 10, 1984).
42. See, eg., Bradley, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities" 18
GA. L. REv. 43 (1983).
43. Id. at 55. ("A RICO allegation can inflict serious harm in a takeover bid or proxy contest
when voters cannot understand the importance of the alleged predicate offenses but do think they
understand what organized crime and 'racketeering' are").
44. The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741, criticized the use of
the federal securities laws to obtain broad discovery opportunities. The Court emphasized that ex-
tensive discovery is a common occurence in securities litigation.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion expanded:
mo the extent that [liberal discovery] permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to
simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an
in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that
the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.
Id.
RICO, however, exposes defendant to more extensive discovery than an ordinary securities fraud
action.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
46. RICO authorizes inquiry into matters beyond the immediate scope of the predicate securi-
ties violations. A plaintiff, for example, may inquire into the use of funds obtained from the alleged
pattern of racketeering activity, into the general business affairs of the defendant, and into the busi-
ness affairs of those with whom he associates.
47. Several sanctions may be available to curb the use of broad discovery as a harassment
device in RICO actions. In Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)] 98,361 at 92,2217 (D. Mass. 1981), the court asserted that "prudent and
economical case management" required a stay of all discovery until the plaintiff demonstrated a
legally compensable injury. In addition, a 1983 amendment to rule 26(b) gives the trial court discre-
tion to limit discovery if it determines that further discovery would be "unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative" or "unduly burdensome or expensive." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Finally, a few courts
have imposed sanctions on RICO plaintiffs for bringing RICO actions in bad faith pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See, e.g., King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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II. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS
Troubled by the inconsistency between RICO's purpose and its use,
courts have limited RICO's application by imposing three requirements:
(1) the organized crime "nexus" requirement, (2) the racketeering injury
requirement, and (3) the prior criminal conviction requirement. These
judicial limitations provide a starting point in determining how Congress
should amend RICO.
A. The Organized Crime "Nexus" Requirement
The earliest attempt to limit the broad scope of RICO required the
plaintiff to allege a "nexus" between the defendant and an organized
criminal association. a8 In Barr v. WUIITAS, Inc. , the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court
refused to allow the plaintiff to add a RICO count, reasoning that Con-
gress aimed RICO at a "society of criminals." In addition, the court
held that it would be unfair to give an organized crime stigma to the
defendant.50 Most courts, however, have rejected the nexus require-
ment.5' Predicating a RICO violation on membership in a criminal or-
ganization also raises the constitutional problem of creating an offense
based on status.52
Focusing on the idea that RICO prohibits conduct rather than status,
some courts have developed a refined version of the organized crime
nexus requirement, looking to RICO's purpose to determine the conduct
Other courts, however, have declined to impose sanctions under rule 11 because of the confusion
surrounding civil RICO. See Hudson v. Larouche, 579 F. Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
48. The most influential of the many organized criminal groups in America in 1969 was La
Cosa Nostra with an estimated membership of 3,000 to 5,000. Combined into 26 core groups, each
known as a "family," La Cosa Nostra constituted the heart of organized crime in America. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 36.
49. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
50. Id. at 113 (RICO is not aimed at legitimate business, but rather at "a society of criminals
operating outside of the control of the American people and their governments").
One commentator argues that RICO claims can stigmatize defendants only if courts restrict the
applicability of the statute to those allegedly tied to organized crime. See Note, Civil RICO: The
Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (statutory language
does not premise a RICO violation on allegations of any connection with organized crime), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 1280 (1984). In the context of criminal RICO actions, courts have also consist-
ently rejected an organized crime "nexus" requirement.
52. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982) (RICO should not be interpreted
as creating a status offense), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
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within its reach. In Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,5" a civil RICO action
based on securities fraud, the court required that the defendant's activi-
ties somehow relate to the evils that Congress sought to prevent. 4
In United States v. Ivic," a criminal RICO action, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals expressed dissatisfaction with the application of RICO
to situations far removed from its purpose. The court reversed the con-
viction of four Croation activists, holding that RICO should be applied
only to economically motivated activities.16 The defendants' conduct in
this case was motivated solely by political belief and did not pose a threat
similar to that posed by organized crime.5 7
B. The Racketeering Injury Requirement
Some courts have also limited the application of RICO to situations in
which the plaintiff sustains a certain type of injury. In North Barrington
Development, Inc. v. Fanslow,58 the court required an injury to competi-
tion caused by the RICO violation. The court reasoned that Congress
intended section 1964(c) to prevent interference with free competition. 9
In Schact v. Brown, however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
53. 566 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
54. Id. at 643-44. In Adair v. Hunt Int'l. Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746 (N.D. Ill.
1981), the court refused to extend RICO to ordinary securities fraud. The court noted that it "is a
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Id (citing United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979), quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). But see Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(rejecting argument that RICO should be limited to activities that fall within the "penumbra" of
activities engaged in by organized crime).
55. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 59 n.5. The court's conclusion that a criminal indictment must allege that the defend-
ant's activities have a financial purpose rests in part on the common understanding of the word
"racketeer" as one "who extorts money or advantages by threats of violence or by blackmail." Id. at
61. Additionally, the politically motivated conduct of the four Croation activists was unrelated to
the type of activities that "annually drain billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful
conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption." Id. at 62.
57. Id. at 64-65.
58. 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
59. Id. at 210. The early legislative history of RICO provides some support for the competitive
injury requirement. Senator Hruska introduced a bill, S. 1623, as an amendment to the antitrust
laws. The language of S. 1623 was similar to § 1964(c) and was aimed at organized crime. Senator
Hruska commented that S. 1623 "also creates civil remedies for the honest businessman who has
been damaged by unfair competition from the racketeer businessman." 115 CONG. REC. 6993
(1969). The Senate, however, rejected the idea of attacking organized crime through the antitrust
laws.
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jected a competitive injury requirement, 60 reasoning that Congress was
concerned with harm to investors and to the general public welfare.61
Many courts have analogized RICO to the antitrust laws, requiring a
"racketeering injury.",62  Because section 1964(c) requires an injury "by
reason of a violation of section 1962, ''63 these courts have reasoned that
injuries caused directly by the predicate acts alone are not
compensable.64
In Landmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades,65 the court dismissed a civil
RICO count in a complaint alleging securities fraud because the plaintiff
failed to show an injury "by reason of' a RICO violation. The court
explained that section 1964(c) requires something more than injury from
60. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
61. 711 F.2d at 1357. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384,
391 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S.Ct. 3291 (1985) (Congress' concerns in exacting RICO extend much
farther than injury to free competition); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516-17 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1984) (the objectives of RICO go beyond the objective of the antitrust laws).
Congress explicitly rejected an amendment to the antitrust laws that would have provided reme-
dies for competitive harm caused by organized crime infiltration. 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969). As
noted in a report by the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association:
[Some) activities of organized crime in legitimate business may or may not be subject to the
antitrust laws. Thus, some extortion tactics and business takeovers by organized crime
might not be reached under the antitrust laws, particularly if they affected only the victim-
ized business rather than resulted in a lessening of competition in an entire line of
commerce.
Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 556-557 (1969); see also Note,
supra note 50, at 1111 (competitive injury requirement would "arbitrarily undermine RICO's
potency").
62. Courts have variously referred to this requirement as a "racketeering injury," "racketeering
enterprise injury," or "RICO injury." These terms refer to a standing requirement based on the type
of injury to the plaintiff, and are generally interchangeable.
63. Both § 1964(c) of RICO and 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) of the Clayton Act require an injury "by
reason of" a RICO or antitrust violation. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477,
489 (1977), the Supreme Court construed 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), the Clayton Act's civil remedy provi-
sion, to require an injury of the type the statute was intended to prevent-an "antitrust injury."
Drawing upon the analysis of Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, several courts have imposed a similar standing
requirement in RICO cases, predicating civil RICO liability on a "racketeering injury." See, e.g.,
Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("plaintiff must allege
not only injury from the predicate offenses, but injury of the type the RICO statute was intended to
prevent").
64. But see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 105 S.Ct. 3291 (1985) ("by reason of" language imposes proximate cause requirement;
therefore, direct injury from predicate acts is sufficient); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express,
567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff need only allege injury caused by the predicate
acts).
65. 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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the predicate acts.66 The court observed that a RICO injury might oc-
cur, for example, if the infusion of money into an enterprise from a pat-
tern of racketeering activity enhanced the defendant's ability to harm the
plaintiff.67
The Supreme Court, however, rejected any requirement of special in-
jury in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,68 holding that injury caused di-
rectly by the predicate acts are compensable under RICO.69 The Court
stated that the competitive injury and racketeering injury requirements
are inconsistent with RICO's purpose. By imposing a special injury re-
quirement, courts fail to focus on the defendant's conduct and ignore
RICO's remedial purpose.7" In addition, a standing requirement that
limits the class of plaintiffs who can recover under RICO also ignores
RICO's remedial purpose.7
C. The Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,72 the Supreme Court also reversed
the Second Circuit's requirement that a private action proceed only
against a defendant already convicted of a RICO violation or of a predi-
cate act.73 The Second Circuit intended its prior criminal conviction re-
66. Id. at 208.
67. Id. at 209. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), the court re-
quired an injury flowing from the pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 516. The court gave the
following example of a distinct RICO injury: The defendant committed multiple acts of arson
against the plaintiff. As a result of the arson, the plaintiff's insurance company canceled his policy.
Subsequently, the plaintiff suffered an innocent, uninsured fire loss. This loss, the court concluded,
flowed from the pattern of arson rather than any particular act of arson and, therefore, would be
compensable under § 1964(c). Id. at 517.
68. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
69. Id. at 3284-87.
70. Id.
71. Id. See also Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (racketeer-
ing injury requirement undermines purpose of RICO); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l, 555 F.
Supp. 47, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1982) ("Such a rule wold leave money derived from actions prohibited by
RICO precisely where Congress did not intend it to remain, in the hands of RICO violators.").
72. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985), rev'g, 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
73. Sedima was the first of a trilogy of cases handed down on successive days by the Second
Circuit. The second of these cases, Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Kearse, J.), held that a plaintiff must allege a distinct "racketeering injury." See supra note 67.
Both Sedima and Rhoades represent a concerted effort by the Second Circuit to end the abuse of civil
RICO. See Eason, New 2d Circuit Curbs Point Up Civil RICO Chaos, Legal Times, Aug. 6, 1984, at
2, col. 2. In the third decision, Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984) (Pratt, J.), the Second
Circuit panel sharply criticized the holdings in Sedmia and Rhoades but decided the case on their
authority.
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quirement to curb the abuse of private civil RICO.7 4
The legislative history offers little indication of the intended scope of
section 1964(c). At the time of the Senate Report and the House Judici-
ary Committee hearings, RICO did not contain a private treble damages
provision.75 Because Congress added section 1964(C) 76 to the Senate bill
as an afterthought, the treble damage provision received only limited dis-
cussion prior to RICO's passage." The silence of the legislative history
74. Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex, 741 F.2d at 487. Judge Oakes observed:
Section 1964(c) has not proved particularly useful for generating treble damage actions
against mobsters by victimized business people. It has, instead, led to claims against such
respected and legitimate "enterprises" as the American Express Company, E.F. Hutton &
Co., Lloyd's of London, Bear Stearns & Co., and Merrill Lynch, to name a few defendants
labeled as "racketeers" in civil RICO claims resulting in published decisions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
75. S. 30, title IX, derives predominately from S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC.
9568-71 (1969). Neither S. 1861 nor S.30 contained a private cause of action. An earlier version of
S. 1861, S. 1623, did contain a private cause of action patterned closely after a provision contained in
the Clayton Act. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. RIc. 6995-96 (1969). The legislative
history provides no explanation why S. 1861 did not contain a private cause of action. But see
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Crim-
inal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1017-18 (1980) (private cause of action dropped "in an
effort to streamline [the OCCA] and sidestep a variety of complex legal issues, as well as possible
political problems in trying to process legislation that expressly created a variety of both public and
private remedies").
The Senate initially passed S. 30 on January 23, 1970 by a vote of 73-1. At that date, S. 30 did not
contain a private cause of action. 116 CONG. REc. 972 (1970).
76. The House Judiciary Committee added § 1964(c) to S. 30 on October 6, 1970. H.R. 19586,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 35,242 (1970).
77. The day after § 1964(c) was added, Congressman Poff discussed each provision of S. 30 and
made the following brief remark about the addition of a private remedy:
[A]t the suggestion of the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Steiger) and also the American
Bar Association and others, the committee has provided that private persons injured by
reason of a violation of the title may recover treble damages in Federal courts - another
example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized criminality.
116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970). Subsequently, Congress discussed the addition of a private cause of
action on only one occasion.
In Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984), afjfd, 105
S.Ct. 3291 (1985), the Seventh Circuit conceded that "the legislative history includes relatively little
material on RICO's private civil remedy." 747 F.2d at 390. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
Congress "deliberately chose the very broad language of RICO's provisions." Id. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that Congress chose to provide "civil remedies" by balancing the need for broad
remedial measures against the virtues of "tight, but possibly overly astringent, legislative draftsman-
ship." Id. In support of a broad construction of § 1964(c), the court pointed to the civil liberties
groups who unsuccessfully argued that RICO's provisions were overbroad and would have a chilling
effect on civil rights. Id.
Reliance on this legislative history, however, is unjustified. On June 9, 1970, Senator McClellan
urged the Senate for the last time to reject the "specious" arguments of "overbreadth" asserted by
the ACLU. 116 CONG. REC. 18,913 (1970). The version of the OCCA presented to the Senate on
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indicates that Congress was unaware of the potential impact of a private
treble damage remedy.
III. REQUIRING A RICO CONVICTION: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A broad construction of RICO has proved ineffective in combatting
organized crime.7" Although some courts have imposed limitations on
this broad construction, the Supreme Court in Sedima effectively re-
moved these limitations from future use. Congress should respond to
Sedima by amending section 1964(c) to require a prior RICO conviction.
A prior RICO conviction requirement would prevent abuse of civil
RICO by restricting its application to previously determined criminal
conduct.
Current private civil RICO does not effectively attack organized crime
because fear and participation in the enterprise often prevent victims of
organized crime from complaining to federal authorities or bringing suit
under RICO.79 Because the Organized Crime Control Act offers protec-
tion to private informants in a criminal, but not a civil, RICO action,80 a
private plaintiff would be more likely to bring a RICO action against a
that day, however, contained no private civil remedy. Section 1964(c) was not added to the OCCA
until October 6, 1970. See supra note 76. Thus, Congress did not engage in a balancing test with
respect to privity civil RICO.
Other courts have also relied on Congress' recognition that criminal RICO would have a broad
reach to support a broad construction of § 1964(c). See, eg., Shacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1354
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983) (Congress provided civil remedies for an "enormous
variety" of activities, citing pre-§ 1964(c) legislative history).
78. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
79. The realization that victims of organized crime are typically uncooperative highlighted the
need for a comprehensive federal effort against organized crime. The Senate Hearings observed:
The organized crime investigation, however, does not generally begin with a complaint
because the "victim" of organized crime is often a participant in the racketeer's unlawful
acts or illegal conduct.... Another deterrent to reporting the crime is the large number of
unsolved gangland murders and the resulting fear to be an "informant." Protection of
organized crime witnesses and members of their families against threats, intimidation, and
bodily harm is absolutely essential.
Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Sen. Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1969) (statement of
Attorney General Mitchell).
80. See supra note 2. Prior to the inclusion of a private remedy in RICO, Congress recognized
the limited role of private citizens in the effort against organized crime. Congress noted the value of
distributing pamphlets to businessmen to educate them about the warning signs of incipient organ-
ized crime infiltration. See Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Hearings on S. 30,
and Related Proposals, Relating to the Control of Organized Crime in the United States, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 409-10 (1970) (citizen awareness and involvement is essential).
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defendant who had already been convicted under criminal RICO. 1 Af-
ter the government obtained a criminal conviction of the defendant with
the victim's help, the victim could then impose additional sanctions on
the defendant in the form of treble damages.
The following suggested amendment to section 1964(c) of RICO incor-
porates a prior RICO conviction requirement:
8 2
§ 1964 Civil Remedies
(c) Any person injured by an act of racketeering activity that results in a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter, for which the government has ob-
tained a conviction under section 1962 of this chapter, may sue therefor in
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
IV. IMPACT OF A PRIOR RICO CONVICTION REQUIREMENT
The proposed amendment would allow private recovery for injuries
caused by a single act of racketeering activity. In a situation in which a
defendant committed three separate acts of arson against the properties
of three different persons, most courts today would deny a section
1964(c) cause of action against the defendant because each plaintiff's in-
jury failed to result from a pattern of racketeering activity with regard to
him. 3 Under the amendment, however, once the government proved
that the three acts of arson established a pattern of racketeering activity
by which the defendant maintained an enterprise in violation of section
1962, each victim could sue the defendant for treble damages. The
amendment, therefore, would better fulfill RICO's purpose of eliminating
organized crime by means of financial divestment. If a jury determined
that a defendant's activities were within the scope of RICO, the defend-
81. One commentator has noted:
It is not clear whether treble damages really offer a significant incentive for a private plain-
tiff to take on organized crime syndicates. If one is not willing to lose one's house, or one's
family, for single damages, one is not likely to find trebel damages to be a much better
bargain. On the other hand, treble damages are likely to be sought by private plaintiffs
who have no fear of reprisal from a defendant, perhaps because the defendant is not the
sort of criminal the statute meant to attack.
Bradley, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities", 18 GA. L. REV. 43,
53 n. 65 (1983).
82. This amendment requires the addition of a provision establishing that the criminal action
would toll the limitation period for the § 1964(c) action. For example, the limitation period on the
§ 1964(c) claim might run for one year from the date of judgment in the criminal action.




ant would be subject to civil liability. 4
The proposed amendment would also promote a more efficient use of
RICO. Victims would have an incentive to aid the prosecution of viola-
tors because they would have a financial interest in the outcome. Also,
the amendment would prevent plaintiffs from bringing section 1964(c)
actions in bad faith, thereby conserving considerable judicial resources.
The amendment would also make the use of collateral estoppel avail-
able, increasing the effectiveness of private civil RICO. A prior criminal
RICO conviction would estop a defendant from denying the essential al-
legations of a RICO offense in a subsequent civil proceeding.85 In order
to prevail, a private plaintiff would only be required to prove that the
defendant's activities caused him injury.
V. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the proposed amendment would halt the abuse of pri-
vate civil RICO. In particular, the proposed amendment would halt the
use of RICO as an alternative and cumulative remedy to the federal se-
curities laws. By injecting prosecutorial discretion into civil RICO, the
proposed amendment would unite the government and private citizens in
a single front against organized crime. The adoption of a prior criminal
conviction requirement is a necessary and practical solution to the appar-
ent failure of section 1964(c).
Paul L Rachlin
84. In Sedima, the Supreme Court noted potential problems associated with a prior criminal
conviction requirement. 105 S.Ct. at 3282 n.9. The Court reasoned that such a requirement would
restrict the availability of private actions and would create incentives for plea bargaining. In addi-
tion, the requirement might create problems with self-serving trial testimony and with the statute of
limitations. Id. While these claims may well arise in unique cases, the documented abuse of civil
RICO absent a prior conviction requirement outweighs the risk. Also, the statute of limitations
problems are not insurmountable. See supra note 82.
85. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(d) (1984) currently estops a defendant convicted under criminal RICO
from denying the essential allegations of the RICO violation in a subsequent civil proceeding
brought by the government. In County of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136, 137 (N.D. Ill. 1982),
for example, the government had obtained criminal convictions of the defendants under § 1962(d)
for their participation in a conspiracy to obtain fraudulent real estate tax assessment reductions by
bribing county officials. Noting that federal law no longer required mutuality for the "offensive" use
of collateral estoppel, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
defendants' liability under § 1962(d).
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